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Indian Reserved Water Rights:
The Winters of Our Discontent
Water is critical to make the western desert bloom,' and water
development has permitted the western states to enjoy spectacular
growth in recent years.2 Indian reservations in the West have not shared
this growth,3 but enormous Indian water claims 4 will strikingly affect
the economic futures of both the Indians and the region. Unfortunately,
legal uncertainty about Indian water rights impedes future western
growth and threatens Indian aspirations for economic improvement.
The Indian water rights issue is pressing: 5 demand for water is increas-
ing rapidly,6 non-Indian claims to water already exceed existing sup-
plies, 7 and the issue arises in an area of great federal-state conflict."
In Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court in 1908 recognized
1. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 51-61 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NAT'L WATER COMM'N]; PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE
THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 141-42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC]; U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CRITICAL 'WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN
STATES-WESTWIDE STUDY 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS].
2. See SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PATTERNS OF REGIONAL
CHANGE-THE CHANCES, THE FEDERAL ROLE, AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 5, 8, 11, 117, 123
(Comm. Print 1977) (data on rapid economic expansion of West).
3. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 305-06 (1977) ("There
has been an obvious lack of meaningful development of tribal lands while one can observe
prospering communities just beyond reservation borders.")
4. A water right is an intangible right to the flow and the use of the water but not to
the corpus. Weil, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Water Courses in
the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 254 (1918).
5. The problem has recently been described as a "time bomb," Blundell, Colorado
River, Vital to Southwest Travels Ever-Rockier Course, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1979, at 1,
col. I, at 16, col. 5; and as "the last big shoot-out in the West," Raines, American In-
dians: Struggling for Power and Identity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1979, § 6 (Magazine) at
21, col. 1, at 48, col. I (quoting Forrest Gerard, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for
Indian Affairs).
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON WATER FOR ENERGY IN THE UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 58-71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WATER FOR ENERGY]; CRITICAL
WATER PROBLEMS, supra note 1, at 5-14.
7. See, e.g., F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 33 (1971) (prepared
for National Water Commission) (most streams in West fully appropriated); WATER FOR
ENERGY, supra note 6, at 70 (Upper Colorado River Basin surface water over-appropriated).
8. The states have developed systems of water law that regulate the pattern of water
development. However, federal assistance is necessary to finance and construct large water
projects, and the federal government owns more than half the land in many western
states. This has been the basis for a century of conflict over power to determine water
policy and over the allocation of water to federal projects and to federal uses. Water
policy has been the most persistent and intense federal-state conflict in the West. See F.
TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 87-103 (analyzing the history and major points of conflict
between state and federal governments over water law policy).
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an implied water right associated with Indian reservations. 9 Reserva-
tions occupy substantial land in the West, 10 yet most Indian reserved
rights have never been officially quantified." Although the reserva-
tions previously used only small amounts of their reserved water,12
the Indians are now demanding much larger quantities for agriculture,
energy development, fishing, and tourism.' 3 Many claims extend be-
yond available supplies and threaten the rights of current non-Indian
water users.14
This Note explores the legal uncertainty surrounding Indian water
rights and finds that this uncertainty impairs public water plan-
ning, distorts water investment decisions, and handicaps negotiations
important to Indian economic development. The Note evaluates pos-
sible avenues for defining the scope of Indian reserved rights-ad-
ministrative, legislative, and judicial decisionmaking-and suggests that
the best means for further definition is adjudication by federal courts.
I. Indian Water Rights Problems
State law governs most private use of western water and defines the
quantity, priority, point of diversion, and time and nature of use for
each state-created water right.15 Implied Indian water rights, however,
are independent of state law and enjoy a higher priority claim than
most non-Indian rights.' 6 Several elements of Indian reserved rights,
such as quantity, point of diversion, transferability, and permissible
9. 207 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1908). A similar implied water right has also been recognized
for certain federal lands. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (national
forests); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (national forests, national recreation
areas, and national wildlife refuges).
10. There are 172 Indian reservations in the 11 western states. These reservations
comprise 12% of the private lands and are occupied by 1% of the area's population.
CRITICAL WATER PRoBLEMs, supra note 1, at 6.
11. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 479; Clyde, Special Considerations Involving
Indian Water Rights, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 237, 244 (1975).
12. F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 125-26; NAT'L WATER CO.IM'N, supra note 1, at 479.
13. See WATER FOR ENERGY, supra note 6, at 8 (1974); Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-
The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GONz. L. REv. 215, 216, 239 (1971); Price & Weather-
ford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Navajo Experience in the Colorado
River Basin, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 97, 125 (1976); Water for Five Central Arizona
Indian Tribes for Farming Operations: Hearings on S. 905 Before the Senate Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
14. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 166.
15. See Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal Reservation of
Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639, 646 n.21 (summarizing basic legal
elements of state water appropriation systems); F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 29-33
(describing state appropriation rights).
16. See NAT'L WATER COMAI'N, supra note 1, at 476; Clyde, supra note 11, at 244. An
Indian reserved right has an inferior priority claim relative to a private right only if the
latter was perfected prior to the creation of the Indian reservation. See note 55 infra.
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reservation uses, are not clearly defined. Efficient water use and
planning require further definition of these rights, followed by actual
quantification. 17
A. Express State Rights and Implied Indian Rights
Western states generally follow the prior appropriation doctrine of
water law, which recognizes a right only when water is put to beneficial
use and assigns priorities for times of shortage according to a first-in-
time, first-in-right rule.18 In Winters the Supreme Court recognized a
different kind of water right. The Court affirmed a circuit court decree
enjoining upstream non-Indians from interfering with the use of Milk
River water that flowed along the Fort Belknap Reservation border.19
Construing the 1888 agreement that created the reservation,2 0 the Court
17. The terms definition and quantification are used throughout this Note. Quantifica-
tion is the actual measurement of the amount of water associated with an Indian reserved
right. Definition is the formulation of standards that apply to various elements of the
reserved right, including quantity, priority, and permissible use.
18. The prior appropriation doctrine recognizes a water right having the following
characteristics: 1) the basis of the right is beneficial use of the water rather than land-
ownership, and the right may be terminated by abandonment or forfeiture if the use
ceases; 2) the right is stated in terms of a definite quantity, nature of use, time of use,
and point of diversion; 3) priority is determined by the date the right is acquired and is
the basis for allocation of water when claims exceed supply; and 4) the appropriation is a
transferable right of indefinite duration. See note 15 supra (citing sources). Water rights
in eastern, midwestern, and southern states are recognized under the riparian doctrine,
which entitles a property owner to reasonable use of water traversing or bordering his
land. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMIMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 3-4
(R. Dewsnup &: D. Jensen eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as STATE WATER LAws]. Nine
states follow some combination of both appropriation and riparian systems. California,
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Wash-
ington generally follow the "California doctrine" of Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674
(1886), which recognizes that common-law riparian rights are attached to public lands.
The "Colorado doctrine" of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 445 (1882), entirely
rejects the riparian doctrine and is followed in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
Water rights are regulated and administered in most western states as part of com-
prehensive programs to develop and conserve water. See STATE WATER LAWs, supra at 2;
Ranquist, supra note 15, at 646. The western states' authority to allocate private water
rights has been confirmed by federal legislation and the Supreme Court. California-
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 160-63 (1935) (Desert
Land Act, Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), current version at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976), severed
water from public lands, leaving unappropriated waters of nonnavigable sources open to
appropriation).
19. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1906), aff'd, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
The United States brought suit on behalf of the Indians, alleging that all the water of
the Milk River was necessary for the purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation. 207 U.S.
at 567. The defendants held water rights under Montana state law and alleged that they
had appropriated more than 5,000 miners' inches (approximately 7,000 cubic feet per
minute) of Milk River water and would he forced to abandon their homes and farms if
deprived of that water. Id. at 569-70.
20. Id. at 575.
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held that the purposes of the Indians and the government in making
the agreement showed an intent to reserve water with the land.21 The
Court has since relied on Winters to recognize rights for Indian reserva-
tions created by statute or executive order.2 -2 As with other Indian
property, the United States has a fiduciary duty to protect Indian
reserved water rights.23
The water law systems of the western states cannot readily accom-
modate the Winters doctrine because the Indian reserved right is not
limited by the same conditions as an appropriation right. Indian re-
served rights do not originate with diversion and application to bene-
ficial use; they are created and have a priority date at least as early as
the date the land was reserved and are not lost by nonuse.2 4 In addi-
tion, Indian reserved rights are free from the comprehensive state
regulation that governs most private water rights.
B. The Impact of Uncertain Indian Reserved Rights
Uncertainty about the legal elements of Indian reserved rights
plagues state and federal governments, non-Indian water users, and
Indians. Effective water planning requires inventory and quantifica-
tion of all water rights on each stream, 25 but those water officials
charged with the administration of streams do not have a clear quanti-
fication standard and often lack records of the existence and location
of Indian reserved rights. 26 Thus planning for both state and federal
water projects is impaired because neither present nor future water
projects can rest securely on supply estimates.27 Moreover, uncertainty
about Indian reserved rights creates problems for administration and
enforcement of interstate water allocations. 28
The uncertain status of Indian reserved rights also handicaps non-
Indian water users. State law generally offers reasonable certainty on
21. The Court focused on the treaty but also discussed the nature of the land. Id. at
576-77 (settling of Indians possible only if land can be irrigated). The Court concluded
that it could not have been the Indians' or the government's intention to eliminate In-
dian rights to the use of water. Id.
22. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600 (1963).
23. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C.
1972). See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 94-97 (1971) (analysis of basis for
federal government's role as trustee for Indian property).
24. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 109. For discussion of the time immemorial
priority theory for Indian reserved rights, see note 55 infra.
25. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 129-30; STATE WATER LAws, supra note 18, at 16.
26. F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 124.
27. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 460, 467; PLLRC, supra note 1, at 144.
28. See Weatherford & Jacoby, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the
Colorado River, 15 NAT. REsouRcES J. 171, 201 (1975); Comment, Federal Reserved Rights
and the Interstate Allocation of Water, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 813 (1978).
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the nature and scope of state-created water rights." But if non-Indian
water use occurs near an Indian reservation, that use is threatened by
the possibility that an Indian reserved right with higher priority is large
enough to displace the non-Indian use.30 Calculation of expected re-
turns from water-related investment bears a substantial risk premium 1
to reflect legal uncertainty. This increases the cost of investment, makes
financing less likely,32 and distorts water investment decisions.
Substantial non-Indian capital investment uses water that could be
claimed under unused Indian reserved rights.33 At the same time,
economic development on Indian reservations requires investment
capital, which has been scarce and thus far has come predominantly
from the federal government. 34 Thus both Indians and non-Indians
have an incentive to negotiate over reserved rights.3 5 Negotiation is
29. PLLRC, supra note 1, at 142.
30. Uncertain water rights reduce the incentive to develop and invest in water
resources, thus restricting the transfer of water to the optimal economic use. Milliman,
Water Law and Private Decision-Afaking: A Critique, 2 J. L. & ECON. 41, 47 (1959). Non-
Indian use is often the result of water projects that require millions of dollars of invest-
ment. Should Indians develop their reservations through full use of their water rights,
enormous non-Indian capital investments depending on the same water supply would be
impaired. The decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), demonstrates the extent
of the problem. Five Indian reservations in the Lower Colorado River Basin were awarded
one million acre-feet of water per year. If the full allotment were used, Los Angeles
would receive no Colorado River water, even though it has invested $500 million on an
aqueduct to import 1.3 million acre-feet per year. Meyers, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J.
1036, 1042 n.15 (1968).
31. See, Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1, 72 (1966); Note, A Proposal
for the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 1299, 1299
(1974).
32. See Certain Water Rights Claims of the Ak-Chin Indian Community: Hearings on
S. 1582 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1977)
(Sen. DeConcini) (investors fear supplying capital for water-related investment because
Indian reserved rights too uncertain). Cf. F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 128-29 (federal
agencies may be unwilling to invest in projects where water rights jeopardized by Winters
doctrine).
33. See NAT'L WATER CoMfAt'N, supra note 1, at 476.
34. See Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13
LAND & WATER L. Rav. 377, 389 (1978); Comment, Application of the Winters Doctrine:
Quantification of the Madison Formation, 21 S.D. L. Rav. 144, 151 (1976); F. TRELEASE,
supra note 7, at 169.
35. Negotiated agreements can take a variety of forms. Indians can agree to deferral of
reserved water use. The prototype is the Ute-Ouray Reservation's agreement to defer use
of reserved rights in return for participation in the Central Utah Project's storage and
other reclamation works. Indian Deferral Agreement of Sept. 20, 1965 (Contract No.
14-06-W-194, Bureau of Reclamation), covering the Upper Duchesne River and Rock
Creek. Deferral agreements may prevent a disruption of development patterns. They may
also permit time for construction of storage facilities to secure a steady supply. See Clyde,
supra note 11, at 245, 250-51. Alternatively, Indian reservations may agree to shortage-
sharing arrangements. See Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 28, at 200. Indians may also
waive their Winters rights entirely. See Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat.
409 (authorizing Secretary of Interior to study feasibility of certain water projects provided
Ak-Chin tribe agrees to waive Winters rights).
As consideration for these agreements, Indians may receive development of water
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considered the primary conflict resolution process for reserved rights
disputes,3 6 but negotiation encounters difficulties given the uncer-
tainty surrounding the rights. Indians confronting bargaining op-
ponents with great economic and political power hold an inchoate
paper right and may be tempted unduly by immediate economic gains.37
When the federal government as a non-Indian water developer is an
adverse negotiating party, uncertainty over the bargained-for right
compounds the difficulty of fulfilling its trust responsibility to the
Indians.38 Moreover, legal uncertainties about Indian reserved rights
have forestalled agreement in specific Indian water negotiations. 39
II. Uncertainty about Indian Reserved Rights: Scope and Use
Legal recognition of the Indian reserved right occurred seventy
years ago, but important questions about the right's basic elements
remain unanswered. Neither courts, nor legislatures, nor agencies have
defined the two key elements of the right: its scope, including the
quantity of water affected and the priority of the right, and its uses,
including transferability of the right and permissible applications of
Winters water on the reservation. Questions concerning use of the
water are amenable to fixed rules applicable to all reservations, but
uncertainty concerning the scope of the right cannot be resolved
through specific, uniform standards.
projects or other benefits. The Ute-Ouray deferral agreement and the Ak-Chin legislation
both provided water projects for the reservations. In 1968 the Navajos agreed to allow
water to be used for cooling at the Navajo Generating Station, Navajo Tribal Council
Resolution CD-108-68, Dec. 11, 1968, in order to enjoy the economic benefits of the power
station-mainly royalties on coal and wages from employment, see Price & Weatherford,
supra note 13, at 109-19.
36. See President Carter, Message to the Congress, Federal Water Policy, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRs. Doc. 1044, 1050 (June 6, 1978) ("[Indian reserved rights quantification]
should emphasize negotiations rather than litigation wherever possible."); Andrus, U.S.
Dept. of the Interior News Release (Dec. 21, 1977) (praising agreement between Gila
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community and Kennecott Copper Corporation to settle
longstanding dispute over rights to Gila watershed as preferable to time-consuming and
disruptive litigation).
37. See Price & Weatherford, supra note 13, at 118.
38. Cf. Note, supra note 31, at 1306-08 (inventory and quantification of Indian reserved
rights necessary to prevent diminution of rights due to inadequate government protec-
tion). For examples of this conflict of interest problem, see note 76 infra.
39. The uncertain legal content of Indian reserved rights has hampered recent negotia-
tions between the State of Utah and the Ute Indian Tribe. Interview with Dallin Jensen,
Ass't Attorney General for the State of Utah (Jan. 19, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal). Cf. F. GERARD, T. FREDERICKS, G. JENNINGS, & S. McELROY, NATIONAL INDIAN WATER
POLICY REvIEw 24, 27 n.10 (1978) (effective negotiations impossible without clear informa-
tion on Indian water requirements and strength of position of negotiating parties) [here-
inafter cited as INDIAN WATER POLICY]; Price & Weatherford, supra note 13, at 113-14.
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A. Defining the Scope of Reserved Rights
1. Nature of the Uncertainty
Although Winters recognized an implied water right arising from
the purposes for creation of the reservation, the Court did not decide
the full scope of that reservation's right.40 Courts have struggled with
the quantification problem ever since the vague pronouncements in
Winters.4' Subsequent cases have recognized only agriculture as an
economic purpose for a reservation.4 2 But even with this narrow focus,
the quantification standard has not been uniform.
The few cases that address the scope of Indian reserved water rights
reveal varied attempts to discern any teaching from Winters. Some
courts have ruled simply that the right must satisfy the present and
future needs of the reservation and, as in Winters, have therefore re-
fused to fix the total quantity.43 Though attractive to the Indians, this
approach plays havoc with the rest of the watershed, for no one can
know how secure his water rights are.44 Other courts have quantified
according to past and present water use.45 This also may comport with
40. The decree is consistent with a reserved right quantity of 5,000, 7,900, or 11,000
miners' inches, or all the water of the Milk River. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908). The Winters Court was clearly interested in showing the existence of the
reserved right rather than ascertaining the right's quantity.
41. The Court in Winters determined that the purpose of the agreement establishing
the reservation was to convert "nomadic and uncivilized people" to "pastoral and
civilized people." 207 U.S. at 576. The 1888 agreement stated that the Fort Belknap
Reservation was created to "enable [the Indians] to become self supporting, as a pastoral
and agricultural people." Act of May 1, 1888, Ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
42. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); United States v. Powers,
305 U.S. 527 (1939).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (quantity not measured by use at time reservation created
because water reserved for future use); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 832,
835 (9th Cir. 1908) (Indians entitled to water for present uses and future requirements;
decree left open for modification as needs increased).
44. See Meyers, supra note 31, at 70; Clyde, Indian Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND
WATER Ricirs 386 (R. Clark ed. 1967) (open-ended right would hold cloud over all water
rights near reservation).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th
Cir. 1939) (reserved right quantity fixed according to population trend of tribe over 70
years, number of acres cultivated, available water, present needs for domestic use, stock-
watering, and power generating); cf. United States v. Wightman, 230 F. 277, 282-83 (D.
Ariz. 1916) (relying on past experience standard to deny injunction against non-Indian
use of reservation water). The prior experience standard reflects the influence of the
western prior appropriation, beneficial use principle because western water law does not
recognize a right unless the water is actually used. Some commentators have expressed
support for an experience standard for quantification. See, e.g., Sondheim & Alexander,
Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-Riparianism? 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 1,
42-50 (1960); Note, supra note 31, at 1313-14.
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Winters because the non-Indian use in Winters interfered with prior
Indian use. But because Indian reservations generally have used only a
fraction of their reserved water, 46 fixing reserved rights at historical or
present use levels could freeze reservations into permanent economic
underdevelopment, 47 and the Winters Court appeared to contemplate
an economically viable community.48
In Arizona v. California,49 the Supreme Court offered a standard for
measuring Indian agricultural water: that amount necessary for all
"practicably irrigable acreage."5 Except for its failure to provide
guidance on the technological standards or economic feasibility to be
used in applying this formula,51 the Court may have settled the uncer-
tainty surrounding the quantity for Indian agriculture because its
standard accommodates present and future needs and facilitates de-
termination of a fixed amount. However, the Arizona standard is not
dispositive of the quantification issue because the Court did not ex-
pressly declare irrigable acreage as the applicable standard for all In-
dian agricultural water.52 More important, the Court did not decide
46. See note 12 supra.
47. This would have been the effect of H.R. 9951, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). The
bill would have required federal district courts to quantify Indian reserved water rights
on the basis of highest annual actual permissible use in any of the five years preceding
Jan. 1, 1977. Id. § 8(a).
48. The Winters Court spoke of the reservation and by implication the use of water
"to change" Indians to a "pastoral and civilized people." 207 U.S. at 576.
49. 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree at 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
50. 373 U.S. at 600.
51. The Special Master relied on a 1952 Bureau of the Budget report for agricultural
technology to determine the amount of water for the practicably irrigable acreage. S.
RIFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER-ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA 267-82 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as MASTER'S REPORT] (relying on BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-47 (Dec. 31, 1952) (officially withdrawn May 15, 1962)). The
quantification analysis suggested in this Note argues that a fixed amount of Winters water
was reserved with the land, see pp. 1700-01 infra. If the measurement of Winters water is
based on technology existing at the moment of quantification or on an estimate of future
technological development, this would allow the quantity of reserved rights water to shift
with technological change, and thus undermine the objective of reducing uncertainty
surrounding Indian reserved rights. See Comment, Federal Reserved Rights in Water:
The Problem of Quantification, 9 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 89, 101 (1977). Technology at the
time the particular reservation was established would provide a reference point consistent
with the theory of a determinate quantity, but determination of 19th century water
technologies would be difficult. A brightline standard applicable to all reserved rights
seems preferable. Technology problems should therefore be resolved by developing a
single standard applicable to all reservations.
52. In addition to advisory opinion objections, the Court's language can be read to
suggest no intention to set forth a standard for all reservations whose primary activity is
agriculture:
[The Master] found that the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the
present needs of the Indian Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved
to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations. Arizona, on the
other hand, contends that the quantity of water reserved should be measured by the
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whether purposes other than agriculture could be recognized for Indian
reservations, whether those purposes generate Winters rights, and how
those rights should be measured.5 3 Even if an amount of water is
quantified, no court has addressed how far the reserved right extends
to sources outside the reservation when water within the reservation is
less than the scope of the right.54
2. Defining Scope
Efficient water management requires that a chief goal in defining
reserved rights should be to permit accommodation of Indian rights
with the state water systems. This means that the Indian reserved
rights must be fixed in quantity and priority. 5 Co-existence of state
Indians' "reasonably foreseeable needs," which, in fact, means by the number of
Indians. How many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be can
only be guessed. We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and
fair way by which reserved water for reservations can be measured is irrigable
acreage.
373 U.S. at 600-01.
The Court may be suggesting that the irrigable acreage standard is a general standard
for all agricultural reserved water, or that this standard should be limited to cases where
the circumstances show it is fair and reasonable. For some reservations the irrigable
acreage standard would provide substantial water to sparsely inhabited areas. The Arizona
decree awarded the Fort Mohave Indian Reservation an annual 122,648 acre-feet diversion
from the mainstream. 376 U.S. at 345. The largest amount of land ever irrigated in the
Fort Mohave Indian Reservation was 23 acres and the population in 1957 was one family.
C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 172 (1971). The Court did not
foreclose recognition of Winters water based on nonagricultural purposes for the reserva-
tion.
53. The Arizona standard need not be exclusive. The various ways Indian reservations
have attempted to use water suggests that agriculture should not be deemed the only
economic reason for Indian reservations. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 162-63 (citing
Indian use of water for recreation, fishing, tourism, and mining). Indian tribes are
presently asking courts to recognize water for purposes other than agriculture. E.g., United
States v. Bighorn Low Line Canal, Civ. No. CV-75-34 (D. Mont.), amended complaint (D.
Mont., filed Sept. 16, 1975) (seeking municipal, domestic, and stockwatering in addition
to irrigation water for the Crow Reservation); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States,
Civ. No. 75-742 (D. N.M., filed Dec. 12, 1975) (seeking water for irrigation, propagation
and harvesting of fish, recreation, domestic, municipal, and industrial purposes). If
recognized, these purposes would require a quantification standard other than practicably
irrigable acreage.
54. The Court awarded off-reservation water to one reservation in Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, but this was done without comment in the decree or the opinion on the basis for
this decision. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964).
Indian reserved rights currently extend to water that borders, traverses, or arises on the
reservation, and probably include water underlying the reservation. See Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) ("Pupfish Case") (suggesting reservation doctrine applies to
groundwater).
55. Courts have recognized the Indian reserved right priority as effective from the
date when the land was reserved. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
All water appropriated after that date has an inferior right.
But some Indians claim that for ancestral lands the priority should be recognized as
time immemorial because they, not the government, reserved the water. It is further
1697
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1689, 1979
and Indian rights on the same streams implies that they were both
intended to have a determinate scope50 for otherwise the two rights
would undermine each other. Because the existence of the Indian
right depends on the purposes for which each reservation was created,
the quantity of that right likewise should be linked to those purposes.
Quantification according to construction of the intent behind creation
of the reservation can be guided by some broad but nevertheless limit-
ing principles.
Quantification decisions should recognize all economic purposes
requiring water at the time the reservation was created. Under this
approach, the Arizona v. California irrigable acreage formula would be
applicable when appropriate, but fishing, mining, or another activity
could also be deemed a purpose.57 The amount of water decreed
should be sufficient to satisfy the full potential of these purposes. This
would preserve the sensible case law commitment to water for future
needs-a fundamental condition for economic development of the
reservations-while fixing a definite amount. Private users could be
protected by limiting the quantity of the right to the direct economic
argued that the scope of the time immemorial right should not be limited by the same
conditions that apply to other reserved rights. For thorough presentation of this theory
by its leading proponent, see Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of
Water, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 631 (1971); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount
Rights Versus State Rights, 51 N.D. L. REv. 107 (1974).
Acceptance of this theory would not significantly affect relative priorities because most
Indian reservations were created in the nineteenth century before much water was appro-
priated under state law. See Clyde, supra note 11, at 244. However, this theory should be
rejected as it relates to scope. The time immemorial priority has never been recognized.
Moreover, the reservation doctrine supports consistent treatment for the substantive
elements of Indian reserved rights regardless of whether the reserved lands are ancestral.
Most important, equal treatment protects Indian and non-Indian alike against the resur-
rection of uncertainty problems already associated with Indian reserved rights created by
the federal sovereign. See Ranquist, supra note 15, at 654 & n.59 (Indians better pro-
tected if federal sovereign considered source of right).
56. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 21-28 (western prior appropriation doctrine
recognized need for water right with fixed quantity due to multiple demands for water
in an arid region).
57. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978),
the court rejected Indian claims to water to support fish spawning grounds, although
fish were a traditional food source when the reservation was created. The court reasoned
that since fish propagated at a nearby federal hatchery were available to the Indians,
water was not necessary to support spawning. Id. at 1330. The analysis is faulty because,
as the court recognized, both fishing and agriculture are purposes for reserved water.
Both purposes should determine the scope of the right. Off-reservation developments and
changes in use should be independent of the quantity reserved. Although incorrect in
subordinating purposes to present needs in determining quantity, the decision recognizes
that irrigable acreage does not have a monopoly as a quantification standard. The
Supreme Court has said nothing to date about an Indian reservation not exclusively in-
tended to support an agricultural economy. For examples of pending cases claiming
Indian water for purposes other than agriculture, see note 53 supra.
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purposes for creating the reservation, an approach recently adopted
for federal reserved rights of national forests.58 This would prevent
Indian tribes from asserting a host of purposes that would leverage the
Winters doctrine to produce exorbitant claims.59
When riparian and underground water prove inadequate to satisfy
the "direct purposes" criterion, Winters rights could extend to a non-
riparian water supply unless such an extension violates the purposes for
creating the reservation. In some cases off-reservation supply may be
critical to the Indians and may have been intended when the land was
reserved. 60 Again, a narrow construction of "purpose" would tend to
protect other users in the watershed from questionable Indian claims to
water located outside the reservation. 61
Although it is essential to reduce the uncertainty surrounding Indian
reserved water rights, the decisionmaking process for developing the
scope of these rights must be flexible to account for the unique char-
acteristics of each reservation and to accommodate fairly the many
interests involved. Thus, case-by-case determination of the scope of the
reserved rights is a more workable approach than general rulemaking. 0 2
As purposes generating reserved rights are recognized and formulae
for measuring the rights are developed, broad standards governing scope
should emerge to provide a foundation for negotiation, water planning,
and adjudication.
58. In United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Supreme Court defined
the scope of reserved water rights of national forest lands. The Court rejected the
government's claims for water to meet a variety of uses and restricted the scope of the
right to the "limited purposes" for which the reservation was created-timber preservation
and secure water flows. Id. at 705-13. The New Mexico "limited purposes" standard is
confined to forest lands. It is based on construction of the enabling legislation, Organic
Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976), which has authorized
establishment of most of the national forests. The case is significant because over half the
streamflow in the 11 western states originates on national forests. 1 C. WHEATLEY, C.
CORKER, T. STETSON, & D. REED, STUDY OF THE DEvELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF
WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 211 (1969) (prepared for Public Land Law Review
Commission). The New Mexico decision therefore assists water planners and users in
estimating the amounts of a significant portion of federal reserved water entitlements.
59. But see Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservation, 4 J.
CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977) (arguing that the Winters doctrine should confer vastly greater
entitlements than presently recognized).
60. See Decree, Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964) (reservation located
neither on nor adjacent to Colorado River entitled to Winters water from within natural
watershed); United States v. Wightman, 230 F. 277, 282-83 (D. Ariz. 1916) (suggesting that
in appropriate circumstances Indians may be entitled to water from outside the reserva-
tion). There is little if any case law discussion of off-reservation sources.
61. Such a limited construction is responsive to the fears of off-reservation users. But
see Clyde, supra note 11, at 250 (off-reservation source for Winters water would disrupt
non-Indian watershed).
62. See pp. 1702-11 infra.
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B. Defining Permissible Uses of Reserved Rights
1. The Nature of Uncertainty
It has not been determined whether the purposes for which an
Indian reservation was established limit the uses to which reserved
water may be put, and no standards have been developed concerning
permissible changes in the nature and place of use of Indian reserved
water.0 3 One important use of Indian reserved water is to sell or lease
it, with or without the land. Courts have recognized that Winters water
may be sold 4 or leased 5 together with reservation land, but it is not
clear whether reservations may dispose of reserved water alone for non-
Indian off-reservation use. Resolution of these issues will have a
significant impact on the nature and extent of water-related develop-
ment both on and surrounding Indian reservations.
2. Defining Uses
Permitting uses different from the purposes for creating the reserva-
tion is consistent with the basis for the right's existence. Reserved
rights were granted to enable the Indian reservations to function as
self-sufficient economic units. Failure to permit flexible use of Winters
water on the reservation would constrain Indian economic develop-
ment.6 The state appropriation doctrine provides flexibility by allow-
63. See Ranquist, The Effect of Changes in Place and Nature of Use of Indian Rights
to Water Reserved Under the "Winters Doctrine," 5 NAT. RESouRc.S LAw. 34, 35-36 (1972)
(little authority on permissible uses of Indian reserved water).
64. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). The case law is both sparse and
contradictory. Compare United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho
1928) (non-Indian allottee of Indian reserved land acquires Indian priority date but is
subject to state law requirement of beneficial use) and United States v. Preston, 352 F.2d
352, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1965) (suggesting allottee acquired transferable reserved rights) with
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326-29 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (In-
dian reserved rights not transferable because intended for Indian ownership, but Indian
allottees may convey water rights with land).
65. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921). The National Water Com-
mission recommended that the United States make a standing offer to lease any unused
Indian water rights in a fully appropriated stream that the Indians desire to lease to
satisfy needs of non-Indian users. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 481. This
would enable non-Indian users to continue to receive water for projects developed in
reliance on state law, and would enable the Indians to lease their water at fair-market
value without being forced into untimely decisions about important water rights.
66. If the reservation was created for agricultural purposes, the amount of water
could be quantified at least in part by an irrigable acreage formula, but that water should
be available to develop coal or oil shale deposits located on the reservation if that is
the preferred economic use. There is implicit case law support for these propositions. See
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (referring to beneficial uses such as
hunting, grazing, agriculture, and "arts of civilization"); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States,
161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908) (water needed for irrigation, stock raising, domestic uses).
See also MASTER'S REPORT, supra note 51, at 265 (irrigable acreage standard does not limit
use of water to agriculture).
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ing private users to change the place and nature of use according to
certain guidelines, the most important being lack of injury to junior
appropriators.0 7 Riparian state water users also have discretion on
use.08 This same flexibility, subject to the protection of others in the
watershed, must be available to Indian reservations to ensure efficient
allocation of water resources.69
Similarly, free transferability of Indian reserved rights to other
users without a change of priority date should be permitted.70 This is
especially important for the portion of Indian reserved water that is
not used due to the tribes' inability to finance development. 71 More-
over, a full range of lease, sale, deferral, and shortage-sharing arrange-
ments would facilitate the negotiation process.72
Uncertainties concerning reservation uses and transferability of In-
dian reserved water can-and should-be resolved by rules applicable
to all reservations. Legal standards encouraging free substitution and
transfer would provide social benefits in allocative efficiency and
foster gains through exchange to Indian and non-Indian water users.
These elements therefore should not be conditioned by the purposes
for which each individual reservation was established.
III. Defining Reserved Rights-Who Should Decide?
Uncertainties concerning permissible uses of Winters water could
be resolved by rules applicable to all reservations. Uncertainties con-
67. STATE WATER LAws, suPra note 18, at 37-38.
68. Id.
69. Free substitution in the use of the resource by the owner or through exchange is
necessary for allocation to the most valuable use. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 27-31 (1977); Milliman, supra note 30, at 51-56. Legal requirements governing transfers
of water rights under state law have been criticized by economists as too restrictive, C.
MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED
MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES 17-38 (1971) (prepared for National Water Commission).
For a representative state statute on changes in the place and nature of use of appro-
priated water, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1953).
70. Opponents of transferability fear disruption to established use patterns. Clyde,
supra note 11, at 250. However, this same fear extends to reservation use of unused
reserved rights. Moreover, after the reserved water has once been put to beneficial use
either on the reservation or off the reservation following transfer, any further transfer
of the water could involve a change in the place and perhaps the nature of use. Com-
peting private users of the watershed should then be protected by appropriate standards
governing changes of place and nature of use. See Ranquist, supra note 63, at 40-41
(suggesting forms change of use standards would take).
71. See note 34 supra.
72. For a review of the legal issues concerning alienability of Indian reserved rights,
see Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MONT. L. REv. 266 (1972);
Boyden & Pugsley, Use of Indian Water in Developing Mineral Properties, Water
Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute, Paper 5 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Foundation
1978); Wilkinson, Indian Control and Use of Water for Mineral Development, Institute
on Indian Land Development-Oil, Gas, Coal, and Other Minerals, Paper 9 (Rocky Mm.
Min. L. Foundation 1976).
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cerning scope, however, are not amenable to specific, uniform rules.
Thus, the primary concern is to determine the most practical process
for developing broad scope standards.7 3 The task of defining scope can
be undertaken either by legislation or adjudication. The governmental
body charged with defining the rights may be Congress, the courts, or
a federal agency. Regardless of which body assumes this responsibility,
resolution of particular disputes between private users and Indian
reservations must be made against a background of the larger political
battle between the states and the federal government for control over
western water.7 4 The federal-state concerns are supplemented by Indian
fears of unfair treatment at the state level73 and of failure by the federal
government to meet its fiduciary obligations to the tribes.
70
A. Legislation
Clarification of Indian reserved rights is necessary so that uncertain
legal doctrine will not hinder planning, negotiation, and efficient use
of water resources. Congress could directly legislate the standards, or
it could authorize a federal agency to do so through rulemaking
procedures.
1. Congress
Congress holds plenary authority over Indians and their property
77
and decides whether to authorize and fund water projects benefiting
them. In addition, clarification and codification of imprecise common
73. The amount of water associated with Indian reserved rights is the question of
greatest uncertainty and consequence as well as the issue posing the most challenging
problems as to which governmental body should provide standards. Although the analysis
focuses on the unique problems for decisionmaking on the scope of Indian reserved
rights, the political problems in this area extend to the other elements of the right.
Thus, this analysis should help suggest the governmental institution best suited to define
these elements.
74. See note 8 supra. In every Supreme Court case since Winters that involved the
doctrine of reserved water rights, every western state has separately, or together with
other western states, filed an amicus brief in opposition to the position of the federal
government.
75. See note 117 infra (Indian fear of state court bias).
76. For analysis of federal agency conflict of interest problems in protecting Indian
water, see Comment, Interagency Conflicts of Interests: The Peril to Indian Water
Rights, 1972 L. & Soc. ORDER 313, 317-19 (case history of conflict between Newlands
Irrigation Project and the Paiute Indian Tribe's water rights to Truckee River and
Pyramid Lake water); NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note I, at 475 ("In the history of
the United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian
water rights for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier
chapters.")
77. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (plenary power of Congress to
legislate for federally recognized tribes).
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law doctrine is a familiar legislative activity.78 Thus, congressional
action appears appropriate to define the Indian reserved right more
explicitly. However, analysis of the pattern of interest representation
in the legislature counsels against reliance on Congress.
The Indians have no congressional representatives of their own and
are not likely to receive effective representation from their western
legislators. The policy of most western states favoring water develop-
ment merges with the interests of large private users,79 who feel
threatened by an expansive definition of Indian reserved rights. Thus
the political constituency of most western congressmen does not en-
courage support for the cause of Indian water.
The federal trust responsibility may stimulate some advocacy for
Indian interests before Congress, but this might be compromised and
overshadowed by federal interests in reclamation projects that conflict
with Indian water rights.80 Moreover, because actual use of Indian
water on the reservation depends largely on congressionally authorized
funding,81 there may be an inducement to restrict the scope of Indian
reserved rights to avoid difficult spending decisions.8 2 Thus, even
though the federal government might continue to oppose expanded
state control over water, Congress may not serve the best interests of
the Indian reservations.
The history of legislative activity suggests that even if Congress were
the appropriate institution to define Indian reserved rights, legislative
action is unlikely. Over fifty bills have been introduced by western
congressmen since 1955 to abolish the federal reserved right or to
78. See G. GILiO.E, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
79. See Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473,
478 (1977); Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Con-
flicts Over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. R~v. 33, 48-49 (1968).
80. See note 76 supra. In negotiations for the Navajo Deferral Agreement of 1958,
government negotiators for the Indians relied on Bureau of Reclamation data even
though the Bureau was the sponsoring agency for the non-Indian project. Price &
Weatherford, supra note 13, at 114-15. The Navajos gave up Winters claims to 110,000
acre-feet annually, which is diverted to the San Juqan-Chama Project in New Mexico,
where the water is used for irrigation and for municipal and industrial supply for the
city of Albuquerque. In exchange the Navajos are to receive congressional funding of
the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, which contemplates water for irrigation of ap-
proximately 110,000 acres and would require a diversion of over 500,000 acre-feet of water
annually. See Navajo Tribal Council Resolution (CD-86-57, Dec. 12, 1957); 43 U.S.C.
§ 615ss (1976). For background on the projects, see H.R. REP. No. 685, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1681 (1962). By 1975, the San Juan-Chama Project was built and served the non-
Indian community, whereas the Navajos had yet to see a single acre irrigated by the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project. See Price 8- Weatherford, supra note 13, at 128-30.
81. See note 34 supra.
82. This would be a particularly unjustifiable restriction if unused reserved water is
freely transferable to non-Indian users because the Indians would lose the great potential
benefits of exchange.
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modify and subject it to greater state control.8 3 Federal agencies have
proposed legislation for quantification by the federal government.8 4
No major legislation has passed,8 5 and no major legislative proposal
specifically addressing Indian reserved rights has received even serious
consideration.8 6
2. Federal Agency Rulemaking
Agency rulemaking procedures seem to avoid the threat of dispro-
portionate political influence endemic to congressional action,87 and
83. See, e.g., S. 863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ("Barrett Bill") (requiring all federal
water users to acquire rights in conformance with state law and procedure). For a survey
of this avalanche of stillborn legislation, see Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over
Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423
(1966). Three general proposals are recurrent: to bring federal reserved water rights under
state administration and control; to compensate private water users whose water rights
are taken by use of a prior federal reserved right; and to record and quantify all federal
reserved water rights.
Extensive hearings have been held on reservation doctrine legislation. See, e.g., Federal-
State Water Rights: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Rec-
lamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); Hearings on the Water Rights Settlement Act Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation
and Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956).
84. See Kiechel, Inventory and Quantification of Federal Water Rights-A Common
Denominator of Proposals for Change, 8 NAT. REsOURcEs LAW. 355 (1975) (describing
Justice Department proposal for each federal agency to inventory and quantify reserved
water under agency's jurisdiction). The "Kiechel Bill" was never introduced because the
Office of Management and Budget refused clearance. Other legislative proposals are in
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 461-71, 477-83 (quantification of Indian rights
but only modification and limitation of federal reserved rights), and PLLRC, supra note
I, at 144-49.
85. Acute federal-state conflict has been a major cause for failure of legislation con-
cerning federal reserved rights, see F. TRELAFSE, supra note 7, at 130-47; C. BELL, REPORT
ON THE RESERVATION DoCrRINE 20 (1975) (prepared for Federal-State Water Rights Sub-
committee of the Western States Water Council).
86. See Note, supra note 31, at 1301 (reserved rights legislation has not addressed
Indian claims); Hanks, supra note 79, at 57 (arguing that legislative proposals do not
touch Indian rights because any bill giving states greater control over water allocation
would not pass if Indian water involved). Rep. Meed's proposed bill, supra note 47, ad-
dressed Indian rights but never received serious consideration. Even congressional ratifica-
tion of negotiated settlements appears feasible only on an ad hoc basis; such legislation
does nothing to reduce the uncertainty problem beyond the particular reservation involved.
See 124 Cong. Rec. H3408 (daily ed. May 2, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall in support of
the Ak-Chin legislation, quoting letter dated March 24, 1978, to Senator Abourezk from
Interior Solicitor Krulitz) (tribe-by-tribe solutions more sensible than comprehensive
legislation). The impetus for the Ak-Chin legislation, see note 35 supra, arose in the
context of severe water shortage and threatened litigation, see H.R. REP. No. 954, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1978).
87. Agency rulemaking and adjudication would require statutory authorization, 5
U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1976). One proponent of administrative quantification argues that
statutory authority for rulemaking and/or adjudication already exists. Ranquist, supra
note 15, at 719-20. Ranquist finds quantification authority in the Indian General Allot-
ment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1976), which gives the Secretary of the Interior authority
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federal agencies traditionally have assumed responsibility for many
aspects of Indian affairs.s8 Indeed, President Carter recently directed
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to formulate a ten-year plan to inventory
and quantify Indian reserved rights.8 9 Standards promulgated through
rulemaking could be part of this plan. However, federal agency rule-
making raises its own threats of bias.
The history of western water policy reflects bitter federal-state con-
flict, including federal opposition to state control over reserved water.90
A federal agency would bring not only this political stance to the rule-
making task, but also its trust obligation to protect and maximize
Indian water claims. Thus the federal government would be both in-
terested party and decisionmaker in any agency rulemaking. The
federal government's interests and responsibilities would create persis-
tent bias against state concerns. 91
A different source of agency conflict of interest similarly threatens
the interests of the Indians. On all major streams, agencies from the
Department of the Interior compete with Indians for a water supply
that is inadequate to meet both existing and future demands. 92 This
conflict has permitted reclamation projects to frustrate the Winters
doctrine and the trust responsibility.93 The Indians may therefore
benefit from federal agency decisions relative to non-federal interests,
but the Indian cause may be subordinated to federal water objectives
that compete with Winters rights.
Lodging legislative authority in a federal agency rather than Con-
to prescribe rules to distribute a tribe's land and, by implication, water among in-
dividual Indians. However, quantification of Indian reserved rights involves determina-
tion of an Indian reservation's water rights vis-A-vis non-Indians-a set of considerations
and parties altogether different from those involved in allocating parcels of land to
allottees. Ranquist relies on authority to divide up the whole in order to determine the
size of the whole. A separate grant of legislative authority would seem appropriate.
88. See Singer, Federal Indian Law, 1976 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 41 (discussing role of
Bureau of Indian Affairs in administration of national Indian policy).
89. The directive set June 6, 1979, as the deadline for completion of the plan.
President Carter, Memorandum on Federal and Indian Reserved Water Rights 3 (July
12, 1978). The agency failed to meet this deadline.
90. See note 8 supra. Even though the states and other water users would be given
notice and an opportunity to participate in agency rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), the
political context suggests that no federal agency action could guarantee fair representa-
tion to the wide range of affected interests.
91. As Professor Stewart argues, a primary function of the administrative process is to
guarantee fair representation for a wide range of affected interests in the decisionmaking
process, but agency client interests tend to become overrepresented, which produces a
persistent policy bias in favor of those interests. See Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 1669, 1713 (1975).
92. See Veeder, Confiscation of Indian Winters Rights in the Upper Missouri River
Basin, 21 S.D. L. REv. 282, 292 (1976).
93. See notes 76 & 80 suPra.
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gress may ensure full participation by the affected interests in rule-
making,94 but it does not depoliticize the outcome. The political im-
balance threatened in agency rulemaking would not be corrected on
appeal due to the limited scope of judicial review of rulemaking.9 5
Even if the rulemaking process provided fair consideration of interests,
federal-state antagonisms over water control could cause delays in
implementing any federal agency standard.90
Legislative definition of Indian reserved rights standards could
resolve the problem of uncertainty in one blunt stroke; therein lies
both the attraction and the danger of congressional action or agency
rulemaking. Any definition of the Indian reserved right must be judged
by its workability;97 legislative standards would lack the benefits of
decentralized decisionmaking. Given the diversity of Indian reserva-
tions and the variety of their claims,0 8 fine-tuning and flexibility is
essential in defining the scope of Indian reserved rights. 99
B. Adjudication
The alternative to legislative definition of Indian reserved water
rights is development of standards through case-by-case consideration
of reservations. Such consideration requires close scrutiny of the legal
instruments and circumstances surrounding the creation of the reserva-
tion as well as thorough evaluation of the tribe's economic possibilities
at the time.100 Because the definition of Indian reserved rights is cur-
94. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
95. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978) (emphasizing limited judicial supervision of agency rule-
making); G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEss 227-28 (1974); Bruff,
Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 459-61 (1979).
96. State resistance to implementation is discussed at p. 1708 and notes 106-08 infra.
97. See MASTER'S REPORT, supra note 51, at 262-65 (irrigable acreage standard de-
fended because most workable); Meyers, suPra note 31, at 70-71 (quantification standard
in Arizona v. California defended by Master in negative sense that nothing else is better).
98. See note 53 supra.
99. A legislative definition of Indian reserved rights standards, particularly if such
definition departs from case law following the Winters doctrine, may diminish the value
of a water right relative to that right's value under a judicial declaration. Such legislative
definition could raise a takings issue under the Fifth Amendment. Clyde, supra note 11,
at 247 (due process problems raised if legislature diminishes judicial holdings); NCAI
to GAO: Legislative Quantification of Indian Water Rights Is Not the Answer, 5 Am.
INDIAN J. 33, 35 (1979) (legislative solution will entitle tribes to Fifth Amendment com-
pensation). The takings issue may counsel against legislative definition of Indian reserved
rights, but it is not a decisive factor because prediction about interpretation of the com-
pensation clause is virtually impossible. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (case-law on takings clause widely believed a chaos of confused
doctrine).
100. This was the form of analysis in Winters. The Court construed the 1888 agree-
1706
Indian Water Rights
rently undeveloped, a court or agency adjudicating these rights has
great flexibility to ensure that the result is equitable under the cir-
cumstances of each case. Decentralized decisionmakers would be per-
mitted to learn by experience. This familiar process of common law
evolution would develop outer boundaries for Indian reserved rights
that could be tested in a variety of contexts and adversary proceedings
and could then be applied to particular situations. Reliance on ad-
judication thus involves significantly less potential than the legislative
approach for unwanted rigidities in defining the extent of Indian
reserved water rights.
1. Federal Agency Adjudication
Federal agencies that administer reserved lands have attempted to
inventory and quantify reserved water rights on a case-by-case basis but
have never achieved satisfactory results. 1' 1 Case-by-case development of
reserved rights standards would require agency adjudication without
advance rulemaking. Although agency adjudication, like decisions by
courts, provides an alternative to the blunt legislative approach, reli-
ance on a federal agency gives rise to the same risks that threaten unfair
treatment of state and Indian interests in the rulemaking context. 0 2
These problems of "political" decisionmaking could not be cured
through appeal to the federal courts. The scope of review on appeal
would be narrow: agency factual determinations would be subject to
the "substantial evidence" test,103 while legal interpretations would
probably be judged by their "reasonableness."'10 4 Therefore, the parties'
ment creating the Fort Belknap Reservation in light of the arid conditions and the
intended agricultural community for the tribes. 207 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1908). See also
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-600 (1963).
101. See U.S. GENERAL AccOUNTING Orr., RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND
INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RFSOLUTION 11-13, 21-22 (CED-
78-176 Nov. 16, 1978) (attempts at administrative quantification of federal and Indian
reserved rights generally incomplete and unsuccessful). The most significant constraints
have included lack of funds and lack of statutory obligation, problems the Congress
could easily remedy. See id. at 12-13, 22-24. See also FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
TASK GROUP REPORT 6 (Dec. 1977) (as much as $225 million required for total quantifica-
tion of non-Indian reserved rights in 17 western states and Alaska).
102. See pp. 1705-06 supra.
103. The substantial evidence rule is codified in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), and the
relatively narrow nature of this review is reflected by courts' decisions. See, e.g., Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (reviewing court should leave agency
findings of fact undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence in record); NLRB v.
Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942) (substantial evidence rule applies
to review of inferences). See generally K. DAvIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29 (1958
& Supp. 1970).
104. The substantive content of Indian reserved rights would develop in adjudication
through application of the existing reservation doctrine to facts. Judicial review of
agency decisionmaking has vacillated between the rational basis test and the substitution
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fears that political imbalances will be incorporated into agency ad-
judicative decisions cannot be dismissed by the promise that court
review will correct inequities. 1 5
Agency adjudication, like agency rulemaking, is likely to encounter
numerous delays. 06 Because state law controls most private water
rights, comprehensive quantification of Indian reserved rights will re-
quire cooperation among federal and state officials as well as the
tribes. 07 But given the history of sharply divided interests concerning
this judicially created, inchoate right, strong state resistance can be
expected if the federal government attempts to impose its definition of
the right.108
2. Courts
Until the 1970s, Indian reserved rights litigation arose only in the
federal courts in actions brought by the United States. 0 The in-
of judgment. The Supreme Court has followed a practical approach to the law-fact
distinction. Almost all leading commentators have recognized the need for flexibility.
See, e.g., K. DAvIs, ADmIMSTRATIVE LAw 86-87 (1977). Courts often apply a reasonableness
test to what are analytically questions of law without clearly characterizing the questions
as either law or fact. See, e.g., SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 390 U.S. 207 (1968); NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). The
huge investment in the fact-finding process that Indian water adjudication requires
suggests that any agency adjudication would be accorded substantial judicial respect.
105. The contrary position is taken by Ranquist, Memorandum to the United States
Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Dec. 6, 1976, in Clyde, supra note 44, at 151, 158
(Supp. 1978) (suggesting that problem of federal interests compromising federal trust
responsibility be resolved by providing that administrative law judge and the Office of
Hearings and Appeals affirm any Indian water claim with any semblance of support in
the law, subject to appeal to federal courts).
106. If the parties must rely on courts to assure fair representation, agency adjudica-
tion adds at least two layers to the process of decision: a hearing before an administrative
law judge and proceedings before the Office of Hearings and Appeals. This delays
development of Indian reserved rights standards and unnecessarily frustrates the goal of
judicial economy. There may be adequate potential for case law development through
the active Indian water litigation commenced in the 1970s, making agency adjudication
superfluous for defining the standards governing scope.
107. Cooperation is necessary because Indian water rights must be defined in relation
to competing rights. Data about competing rights on point of diversion, time and nature
of use, quantity, priority, and return flow are needed to coordinate Indian water rights
with state-created rights. Assembling this information will require assistance from both
the tribes and state officials.
108. Interview with Dallin Jensen, supra note 39 ("The states will fight [federal
agency quantification] to the wall.") The specific tactics of state opposition cannot be
predicted without knowing the details of the agency adjudication program, but state
obstruction would probably involve resistance to discovery as well as dilatory motions and
appeals intended to frustrate federal agency development of substantive standards for
Indian reserved rights.
109. Federal and Indian reserved rights were thought to enjoy sovereign immunity
and were therefore absent from state general adjudications. See Brief for the United
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frequency of such actions" ° is a principal reason the reservation doc-
trine has not matured. However, the Department of Justice has em-
barked on a vigorous program to adjudicate Indian reserved rights in
federal courts"' and from these cases general quantification standards
should emerge.
The opportunity for federal courts to clarify Indian reserved rights
has been considered uncertain in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.1 2 The Court held that the McCarran Amendment," 3 which
grants a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in water rights ad-
judication, applies to Indian reserved rights and evidences a preference
for adjudication of those rights in a state general adjudication. The
United States had brought an action on behalf of Indian rights in a
federal district court; dismissal was deemed justified when the United
States was subsequently joined in an ongoing state proceeding." 4 This
result was based primarily on the recognition that a state general water
rights adjudication is the best procedure for defining and integrating
the rights of all users of a stream or watershed.11 5
States at 8-19, United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971). This
assumption was rejected in United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971) (McCarran Amendment permits joinder of federal reserved rights in state general
adjudications); United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971)
(same); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
(Indian reserved rights subject to state general water adjudications).
110. In the 70-year history of the reservation doctrine, federal courts have decided
cases involving Indian reserved rights only 15 times. See Clyde, supra note 44 (citing
cases).
111. There are 26 cases pending in federal courts in the West that involve Indian
reserved rights. Letter from Myles E. Flynt, Chief, Indian Resources Stction, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Jan. 4, 1979 (copy on file with Yale Law Journal) (federal cases
pending in Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington). Be-
cause Indian water litigation is assigned to a separate section of the Justice Department,
the danger of compromising the trust responsibility in favor of federal non-Indian water
interests, a concern in the agency context, is reduced. In addition to Department of
Justice representation, the tribes may participate independently in water litigation. New
Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir. 1976).
112. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
113. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
114. 424 U.S. at 809-13. Previously the Court had only held that the McCarran
Amendment permitted joinder of federal reserved rights in state general adjudications.
See United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971); United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
115. 424 U.S. at 817-20. State adjudication would call for both quantification and
establishing priority dates; otherwise the policy underlying state general adjudications-
integration of all water rights on a given stream-would not be fulfilled. The state court
would therefore be faced with defining the content of the reserved right. See Avondale
Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 96 Idaho 1, 4-5, 523 P.2d 818, 821-22
(1974) (under McCarran Amendment, United States bound by Idaho state court's quanti-
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Although the consequences of Colorado River are just beginning to
emerge, the decision does not appear to foreclose federal adjudication
of reserved rights. In fact, it has stimulated a large volume of Indian
claims for water in federal courts,"16 largely because Indians fear state
court bias 1 7 and because the federal water interest opposes state con-
trol over reserved rights."18 Some states have brought Indian reserved
rights into state adjudications," 9 but the states and private users may
hesitate to rush into court before legal uncertainties are resolved. 12 0
Federal jurisdiction is denied under Colorado River only if a state
general adjudication on the same stream or watershed is pending, the
non-Indian parties to the federal action join the United States in the
state court, the federal court proceeding has not progressed significantly
beyond the filing of the complaint, and the federal court exercises its
discretion to dismiss.' 2 ' Most pending cases in federal courts have pro-
fication of reserved rights). The Colorado River Court's reasoning is open to the criticism
that reserved rights will have to be incorporated into state general stream adjudications
whether the reserved right is defined initially by Congress, an agency, or the federal and
state courts. For a representative state adjudication statute, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-4-1 to
-24 (1953).
116. See note Ill suora (26 pending federal cases involving Indian reserved rights).
117. See Ranquist, supra note 15, at 699; INDIAN WATER POLICY, supra note 39, at 22;
Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
743, 744-58 (1975); cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (Indian-state
ill-will).
118. See note 8 supra.
119. Indian reserved rights are being adjudicated in state courts in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Letter from Myles E. Flynt, supra note 111. See
Comment, Determination of Federal Water Rights Pursuant to the McCarran Amend-
ment: General Adjudications in Wyoming, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 457, 459, 475-84
(1977) (describing establishment of statutory general adjudication procedure so that
federal and Indian reserved water rights could be determined in state court). Although
most western states have a statutory adjudication procedure to determine a watershed's
water rights, the Colorado River case may be limited to the continuous stream adjudica-
tion system established in Colorado. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 602 (1973 &
Supp. 1978). Wyoming modeled its general adjudication statute after Colorado's so that
Colorado River could apply. The Montana state legislature recently enacted legislation
to adopt an adjudication procedure similar to Colorado. Sen. Bill 76 (Montana 1979). Other
states have not followed suit, but they safely have jurisdiction over Indian water only if
Colorado River is interpreted liberally. However, Colorado River "could be limited to its
facts." Interview with Alan Cronister, Ass't Attorney General for the State of Montana,
Feb. 27, 1979 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
120. Utah has not adjudicated Ute Indian water claims in state court in part due to
legal uncertainties concerning Indian reserved rights. Utah has pursued negotiation in
order to avoid litigation. Interview with Dallin Jensen, supra note 39.
121. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 809-20. It
is possible that Colorado River will be extended so that Indian water rights will be
further subject to state jurisdiction, a forum considered inhospitable to Indian claims,
see note 117 supra, and whose findings of fact would receive as much deference on
review as federal agency findings. But it is just as likely that Colorado River will be
confined to its narrow procedural facts, see note 119 supra; Abrams, Reserved Water
Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Score of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado
River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1147 n.222 (1978).
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ceeded beyond the danger zone of Colorado River dismissal,' 2- and state
courts cannot ignore the substantive developments in the federal litiga-
tion. The race to the courthouse encouraged by concurrent jurisdiction
may provide the broad range of cases necessary for standards to
emerge.' 3 Furthermore, the Administration is considering a proposal
to repeal the McCarran Amendment as it applies to Indian water. 24
Practical considerations, particularly fairness to the parties, indicate
hazards in either agency or court adjudication. But if Colorado River is
construed narrowly, the courts offer a more promising alternative for
defining the content of Indian reserved rights. Once substantive stan-
dards gain content, the time and expense of reserved rights water
litigation' 25 should encourage the parties to pursue the national policy
preference for negotiating, 26 and both private and public decisions on
water investment and planning will be better informed.
Conclusion
To the Indians, their water in the twentieth century resembles their
land in the nineteenth. The inexorable pressures of white settlement
restricted Indian access to much desirable land and ultimately confined
122. Interview with Steve Carroll, staff attorney, Indian Resources Section, Depart-
ment of Justice, Feb. 27, 1979 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) (Indian Resources
Section staff reviewed all 26 pending cases for author to determine that only five may be
subject to dismissal in favor of state court adjudication).
The United States has brought two actions to adjudicate Indian water rights in
Montana. United States v. Bighorn Low Line Canal, No. CV-75-34 (D. Mont., filed April
17, 1975); United States v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, No. CV-75-20 (D. Mont.
filed March 7, 1975). The State of Montana moved for dismissal of both cases on grounds
that concurrent state proceedings to adjudicate the waters are pending. The federal court
has not ruled on these motions even though they were filed in 1977. Resolution of these
motions could help determine the scope of the Colorado River holding.
123. Doubts about the availability of state jurisdiction over Indian reserved rights
were dispelled to some extent when the State of Wyoming sued in its own courts for a
general adjudication and named the United States as defendant trustee for two Indian
tribes. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System and All Other Sources, No. 4993 (5th Jud. Dist. Wyo. 1977). The United
States removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), but the
district court granted a motion to remand, relying on the McCarran Amendment and
Colorado River. Wyoming v. United States, No. C77-039K (D. Wyo. May 31, 1977) (order
remanding to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976)).
124. Letter from David Harrison, Office of Trust Responsibility, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Feb. 3, 1979 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
125. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has been unable to pursue comprehensive inventory
and quantification in part because available funds have been siphoned off to support
litigation. See U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFF., supra note 101, at 22-23.
126. See note 36 suP ra.
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the tribes to carved out reservations. 12 7 Today, rapid economic and
population growth grasps at Indian water. To the western states, water
is the limiting resource on economic vitality, and the national im-
portance of western water grows with reliance on western energy sup-
plies.' 28 The uncertain status of the Indian reserved right impedes
management of dwindling available water supplies. As a first step in
resolving the Indian water dilemma, the nature of the contending in-
terests and the institutional possibilities calls for the federal courts to
protect Indian interests and to reduce uncertainty through definition
of the scope of Indian reserved water rights.
127. See D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) (describing severe
deprivations of Indian land in late 1800's that were resisted only by late and often
ineffective federal action). See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) ("It can
be said without overstatement that when the Indians were put on these reservations they
were not considered to be located in the most desirable area of the Nation.")
128. CRITICAL WATER PROBrEMS, supra note 1, at 5-6, 9-10.
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